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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3735 
_____________ 
 
FRANCES LAGUARDIA, individually and as Executrix  
of the Estate of James Vincent LaGuardia, deceased, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROSS TOWNSHIP; HOWARD BEERS, JR.;  
RUSSELL A. KRESGE, JR.; TINA DRAKE;  
*TODD MARTIN; JOHN DUNN 
         
(*Dismissed Pursuant to Clerk’s Order entered 2/28/17.) 
______________ 
 
No. 16-3736 
_____________ 
 
PATRICIA A. BAUER; RICHARD E. BAUER, 
   Appellants 
 
v. 
 
ROSS TOWNSHIP; HOWARD BEERS, JR., individually  
and in his official capacity as Ross Township Supervisor; 
RUSSELL A. KRESGE, JR., individually and in his official  
capacity as Ross Township Supervisor; TINA DRAKE,  
individually and in her official capacity as Ross Township  
Supervisor; *TODD MARTIN, in his individual capacity and  
as Sheriff of Monroe County; JOHN DUNN, in his official  
capacity as Ross Township Solicitor 
 
        (*Dismissed Pursuant to Clerk’s Order entered 2/28/17.) 
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___________ 
 
No. 16-3737 
_____________ 
 
LINDA A. GOSS-KOZIC, individually and as 
Administratrix of the Estate of Gerard J. Kozic, deceased, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ROSS TOWNSHIP; HOWARD A. BEERS, JR., individually  
and in his official capacity as Ross Township Supervisor;  
RUSSELL A. KRESGE, JR., individually and in his official  
capacity as Ross Township Supervisor; TINA DRAKE,  
individually and in her official capacity as Ross Township  
Supervisor; *TODD MARTIN, in his individual capacity as  
Sherrif of Monroe Capacity; JOHN DUNN, individually and  
in his official capacity as Ross Township Solicitor 
 
        (*Dismissed Pursuant to Clerk’s Order entered 2/28/17.) 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court Nos. 3-15-cv-01475, 3-15-cv-01523, 3-15-cv-01479) 
District Judge: The Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 27, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, VANASKIE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 3, 2017) 
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_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
_______________________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff-Appellants Frances LaGuardia, Patricia and Richard Bauer, and Linda 
Goss-Kozic appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their Section 1983 claims against 
Defendants Ross Township, the Ross Township Supervisors, Solicitor Dunn, and Sherriff 
Martin for damages sustained when township resident Rockne Newell opened fire at a 
township meeting, killing or injuring the Plaintiffs or their decedents. Even accepting all 
Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, we conclude that Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible claim 
for relief. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s orders dismissing the actions and 
denying leave to amend the complaints.  
I1 
  Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the theory that Newell’s shooting was in response 
to Defendants’ twenty-plus-year “multi-faceted campaign” against Newell, motivated 
primarily by the Supervisors’ desire to acquire Newell’s property.2 Plaintiffs allege that 
the Defendants disproportionately enforced zoning, environmental, and nuisance 
                                                            
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
1 Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we set forth 
only those facts necessary to our conclusion.   
2 See Appellant’s Br. 8; J.A. 14, 25. 
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ordinances against Newell to obtain a judgment against him and force him off his land.3 
Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants knew of Newell’s dangerous propensities and failed 
to adequately protect meeting attendees despite the known threat. In their complaints and 
motions to amend, Plaintiffs cite to instances where Newell was threatening or violent to 
Defendants and other township officials, particularly when he felt the ownership of his 
property was being threatened.4  
 The District Court dismissed the actions for failure to state a claim and denied 
Plaintiffs’ motions to amend their complaints as futile.5 Plaintiffs appeal.  
 
 
                                                            
3 The Township assessed fees against Newell for multiple ordinance violations including 
(1) storing fecal matter on his property without a permit, (2) building a residential 
structure on the property without a permit, (3) building a culvert under his driveway to 
direct storm water without a permit.  
4 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege in their complaint and motion to amend that: (1) At some 
point in the past, Newell told Solicitor Dunn after a court hearing that Newell “would 
have shot [him] that night,” had Newell been deprived of his property by the court; (2) 
Attorney Michael Kaspszyk notified Solicitor Dunn “well in advance” of the shooting 
that Newell had displayed “disturbing” and “alarm[ing]” behavior; (3) At some point, 
Newell spoke to Supervisor Kresge at a diner and said, “You keep this up, and we’re 
going to meet somewhere, me and you. When we’re done, it will only be me;” (4) 
Sometime in the past, Newell threatened Sheriff Martin that if Martin were to come to 
Newell’s property and take it, Martin should shoot Newell because Newell did not want 
to have to shoot Martin; (5) Newell “threatened physical violence” to Solicitor Dunn and 
Supervisor Kresge at some point in the past. J.A. 91–92, 94, 310–12, 487–89. Rockne 
Newell’s father also told deputies serving the sale documents that Newell was upset 
about the sale and warned them that “people are going to die over this.” J.A. 93–94, 312, 
489.  
5 LaGuardia v. Ross Twp., No. CV 3:15-1475, 2016 WL 4502443 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 
2016); Bauer v. Twp., No. CV 3:15-1523, 2016 WL 4502448 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016); 
Goss-Kozic v. Ross Twp., No. CV 3:15-1479, 2016 WL 4502445 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 
2016). 
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II6 
 “Under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead a deprivation of a constitutional right 
and that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of 
state law.”7 Here, the Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ actions violated their Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process rights. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”8 However, “nothing in the language of the Due 
Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its 
citizens against invasion by private actors.”9 Even given this general rule, a plaintiff may 
nevertheless recover if the harm suffered was a result of a “state-created danger.”10 We 
have articulated that recovery under the state-created danger theory requires the plaintiff 
to show the following:  
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the 
state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the plaintiff; (3) there 
existed some relationship between the state and the plaintiff; [and] (4) the 
state actors used their authority to create an opportunity that otherwise 
                                                            
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), our review of the district court is plenary. 
Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prod., Inc., 714 F.3d 761, 765 (3d Cir. 2013). “To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, leave to amend pleadings should be 
freely granted unless the curative amendment would be “inequitable, futile, or untimely.” 
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). 
7 Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008). 
8 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
9 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). 
10 Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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would not have existed for the third party’s crime to occur.11 
 Here, Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims fail the first requirement: The 
harm here was not a “foreseeable” or “fairly direct” consequence of Defendants’ actions. 
To adequately plead foreseeability, “we require a plaintiff to allege an awareness on the 
part of the state [or municipal] actors that rises to [the] level of actual knowledge or an 
awareness of risk that is sufficiently concrete to put the actors on notice of the harm.”12  
 Here, even if Defendants were aware that Newell was erratic and threatening at 
times over the course of twenty-plus years,13 we cannot conclude that Newell’s act of 
murdering township residents at a public mass shooting was a direct or foreseeable 
consequence of enforcing zoning ordinances and satisfying a judgment. Plaintiffs do not 
allege that the Supervisors were aware of any specific threats made by Newell near the 
time of the sale. Generally erratic or threatening behavior displayed over twenty years 
does not translate to “sufficiently concrete” notice that Newell would choose to commit a 
public mass shooting on that day.14 The only warning alleged to have occurred within 
fairly close proximity to the sale or meeting was an incident involving Newell’s father 
(not Rocke Newell himself) telling the sheriff’s deputies (not any of the Defendants) that 
Newell was upset over the sale and that “people are going to die over this.”15 This threat 
is insufficient as a matter of law to conclude that Defendants had “actual knowledge or an 
                                                            
11 Id. at 908 (quoting Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
12 Phillips, 515 F.3d at 238. 
13 See J.A. 91–92, 94, 310–12, 487–89. 
14 Phillips, 515 F.3d at 238. 
15 J.A. 93–94, 312, 489. 
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awareness of” the “concrete” risk that Rockne Newell would arrive at the township 
meeting on that day with an arsenal in tow and begin to fire at attendees.16 
 We also agree with the District Court that the harm was not a “fairly direct” result 
of Defendants’ conduct.17 We have held that “a distinction exists between harm that 
occurs to an identifiable or discrete individual under the circumstances and harm that 
occurs to a random individual with no connection to the harm-causing party” who 
“happened to be in the path of danger.”18 That is, “the harm visited on the plaintiffs [must 
be] more foreseeable than the random attack.”19 Here, Plaintiffs, as attendees of the 
township meeting open to the public, are more akin to “random individual[s]” who 
“happened to be in the path of danger.”20 Plaintiffs’ harm was a direct result of only the 
actions of Rockne Newell, not the Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to 
plead as a matter of law that the harm suffered was a foreseeable consequence of 
Defendants’ actions and therefore cannot plausibly plead state-created danger claims.  
III 
 In denying Plaintiffs’ claims and affirming the District Court, we by no means 
wish to diminish the devastation wreaked by this unspeakably horrifying, senseless, and 
tragic act of violence. Furthermore, we are not insensitive to the extraordinary disruption 
that Newell’s actions caused everyone in the community. However, binding precedent of 
                                                            
16 See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 238. 
17 LaGuardia, 2016 WL 4502443, at *7; Bauer, 2016 WL 4502448, at *8; Goss-Kozic, 
2016 WL 4502445, at *8. 
18 Phillips, 515 F.3d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
19 Id. (quoting Morse, 132 F.3d at 909). 
20 Id. at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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our own court and the Supreme Court of the United States limits the extent to which 
liability can be imposed on state or municipal actors based on the criminal actions of 
third parties. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
the actions and denial of Plaintiffs’ motions to amend the complaints as futile.  
